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DIRECT APPEALS FROM THREE-JUDGE COURTS
MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S 799 (1976)
The Supreme Court held last term in I TM, Inc.
v. Baxley' that direct appeals to the Supreme Court
under 28 U.S.C. § 12532 would lie only when the
three-judge panel below 3 rendered a decision upon
the constitutional merits of the claim.
Appellant was an Alabama corporation which
owned the Pussycat Adult Theater in Birmingham,
Alabama. The Pussycat Theater had been convicted
of violating local obscenity statutes. As a result of
these violations, the state of Alabama moved to have
the theater closed down as a nuisance. 4 A state court
issued a temporary injunction to close down the
theater.
While action on a permanent injunction was
pending in state court, MTM filed an action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama to have the
Alabama nuisance law declared unconstitutional as
violative of the first, fifth, and fourteenth amend-
mer.ts and to enjoin enforcement of the temporary
injunction.
In compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 2281,' a three-
1420 U.S. 799 (1975).
'See note 8 infra.
'Three judges are required to hear requests for injunc-
tions where a state (28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970)) or federal (28
U.S.C. § 2282 (1970)) statute is challenged on a constitu-
tional basis. These panels are also available at the request
of the United States Attorney General pursuant to the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 19 7 1(g) (1970) and
the Civil Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-5(b),
e-6(b) (1970). Also, three-judge courts are required to hear
actions challenging the appointment of the attorney general
on grounds of violation of constitutional provisions govern-
ing compensation and other emoluments (28 U.S.C. § 2284
(Supp. III, 1973)), final rail consolidation plans (45 U.S.C.
§ 719(b) (Supp. III, 1973)), and relief under and suits
contesting the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act,
26 U.S.C. §§ 9010(c), 9011 (b)(2) (Supp. III, 1973).
Until the last session of Congress, three-judge district
courts heard ICC cases (Act of Oct. 22, 1913, ch. 32, 38
Stat. 220), and some antitrust cases (Act of Feb. 11, 1903,
ch. 544, § 1, 32 Stat. 823).
4 Alabama's nuisance law defines a nuisance as "any
place... upon which lewdness, assignation, or prostitu-
tion is conducted, permitted, continued, or exists, and the
personal property and contents used in conducting or
maintaining any such place for any such purpose." ALA.
CODE tit. 7, § 1091 (1958).
'The full text of section 2281 is:
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining
the enforcement, operation or execution of any State
judge district court was convened. This panel,
however, never reached the merits of MTM's consti-
tutional claims. Rather, the court utilized the absten-
tion test set out in Younger v. Harris. ' The district
court found that while the Younger doctrine had
originally been applicable only in suits challenging
state criminal statutes, it would be proper to apply it
to this civil litigation. 7
Appellent carried its appeal directly to the Su-
preme Court under section 1253, which provides
that
any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an
order granting or denying... an... injunction in
any civil action . . . required . . . to be heard and
determined by a district court of three judges.,
statute by restraining the action of any officer of such
State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or
of an order made by an administrative board or
commission acting under State statutes, shall not be
granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the
ground of unconstitutionality of such statute unless the
application therefore is heard and determined by a
district court of three judges under section 2284 of this
title.
28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970).
6401 U.S. 37 (1971). Younger and several cases
handed down the same day effectively restricted the scope of
federal court jurisdiction in passing on the constitutionality
of state criminal statutes. Federal courts were required to
abstain from hearing such claims when there was a pending
criminal action in state court except upon a showing of
irreparable, great, and immediate injury if the court
abstained, 401 U.S. at 46, or bad faith and harassment by
state officials, Id. at 49. Prior to Younger, the abstention
doctrine from Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496 (1941), required that the federal court retain jurisdic-
tion while the state issues were tried in the state court.
Younger requires a complete dismissal by the federal court.
'General Corp. v. Sweeton, 365 F. Supp. 1182 (M.D.
Ala. 1973). The district court expanded upon the scope of
the Younger language, which had been limited to pending
criminal actions, 401 U.S. 37, 55 (Stewart & Harlan, JJ.,
concurring), to include nuisance actions, which are civil in
nature.
'The full text of section 1253 is:
Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may
appeal to the Supreme Court from an order granting
or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory
or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or
proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be
heard and determined by a district court of three
judges.
28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
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Before the Court, appellant challenged the validity of
the lower court's application of the Younger absten-
tion doctrine to the instant case.
The Supreme Court rendered a per curiam deci-
sion, with Justice White concurring in the result and
Justice Douglas dissenting. The Court's holding
failed to reach the abstention issue, but rested instead
upon a flaw in the act of appeal. The Court
interpreted section 1253 to allow direct appeals to
the Court after the denial of an injunction only when
the denial is based upon the three-judge panel's
adjudication of the merits of the constitutional claim
presented. If the three-judge panel fails to reach the
merits of a plaintiff's claim, then a party's recourse is
not directly to the Supreme Court, but rather via the
general appeals route through the court of appeals. 9
Appellant claimed the benefit of section 1253's
direct appeal on the basis that the district court's
abstention on Younger grounds was "an order...
denying . . . an injunction" just as surely as a
decision denying an injunction on the merits would
have been. 10 The Court rejected this straightforward
logic, relying on its decision in Gonzalez v. Auto-
matic Employees Credit Union. 11 In Gonzalez,
direct appeal to the Supreme Court under section
1253 was not permitted for two reasons, neither of
which was clearly explained. First, the constitutional
merits of the case had never been reached, and the
Court thus held that the appeal must go through the
court of appeals, rather than directly to the Supreme
Court by section 1253.12 Alternately, the Court
found that since the appellant lacked standing ab
initio, section 1253 did not come into play and the
proper route was through the court of appeals. 12 By
such reasoning, the Court sidestepped a direct
confrontation on the question of what constituted a
"denial" of an injunction under section 1253.
The Court in MTM rested its reasoning upon the
groundwork laid by Gonzalez in restricting direct
appeals from three-judge determinations. 14 The
Court thus extended the reasoning outlined in Gon-
zalez to a case that, absent the abstention doctrine,
would have had its constitutional claims adjudicated,
holding that
a direct appeal will lie to this Court under § 1253 from
9
"The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from final decisions of the district courts...
except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme
Court." 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970).
10420 U.S. at 802.
11419 U.S. 90 (1974).
21d. at 101.
13]d
11420 U.S. at 802-03.
the order of a three-judge federal court denying
interlocutory or permanent injunctive relief only when
such order rests upon resolution of the merits of the
constitutional claim presented below. '"
In bootstrapping itself so, the Court admitted its
decision might be contrary to past authority, al-
though it added that past decisions were somewhat in
conflict. 16 The Court maintained that its -restricted
reading of section 1253 would not impinge upon the
original purpose Congress had envisioned for three-
judge courts. 17 On the contrary, a broad reading of
the section would "be at odds with the historic
congressional policy of minimizing the mandatory
docket of this Court,"'" and would hamper the
effective workings of the Court by distending its
workload.
Section 1253 was originally passed to placate
increased resentment by states against the actions of
single judge district courts. At the turn of the
century, a great number of state taxation and
regulatory measures were held unconstitutional by a
single judge district court, who then issued injunc-
tions to restrain their enforcement. 19 Following the
validation of this procedure by the Supreme Court
in Ex parte Young, 2' Congress provided for the
establishment of three-judge panels to hear such
claims of unconstitutionality. It was felt that the use
of three judges, at least one of whom would be of
circuit court rank, would eliminate the possibility of
capricious action by a single judge, pool the knowl-
I1d. at 804 (emphasis added).
16Compare Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405
U.S. 538 (1972), with Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S. 427
(1970); Rosado v. Wyman, 395 U.S. 826 (1969); Mengel-
koch v. Industrial Welfare Comm'n, 393 U.S. 83 (1968).
17In Gonzales the Court declared: "Congress estab-
lished the three-judge-court apparatus for one reason: to
save state and federal statutes from improvident doom at the
hands of a single judge." 419 U.S. at 97.
18420 U.S. at 804.
1In the Senate debates caused by the actions of federal
district courts, Senator Overman of North Carolina stated
that:
I saw in Moody's Magazine last week that there are
150 cases of this kind now where one federal judge has
tied the hands of state officers, the governor and the
attorney-general .... My experience is that the State
is sometimes delayed a solid year in collecting taxes
... Whenever one judge stands up in a State and en-
joins the governor and the attorney-general, the peo-
ple resent it, and public sentiment is stirred, as it was
in my State ... and you find the people of the State
rising up in rebellion.
45 CONG. REC. 7256 (1910) (remarks of Senator
Overman).
2209 U.S. 123 (1908). The Supreme Court held that
the eleventh amendment was not a bar to injunctive relief in
federal courts against unconstitutional state activities.
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edge of the three judges in such delicate cases, and
receive greater respect from the state agencies and
officials at whose actions its decision would be
directed. 2 When the Court and Congress clashed
over controversial legislation in the 1930's, three-
judge jurisdiction was extended to constitutional
challenges of federal statutes. 22
Over time, the reasons behind the establishment of
the three-judge court have disappeared. In 1912,
equity rules for the federal courts were promulgated
which greatly restricted the circumstances under
which injunctions could be issued. 23 Furthermore,
subsequent Congressional legislation prohibited the
courts from enjoining certain types of state activity.2 4
The increasing scope of the federal court's abstention
doctrine further undermined the need for three
judges.2 5 Ultimately, Congress began to repeal
some of the acts which form the jurisdiction of the
three-judge courts. 2 6 Thus, the Court reasoned that,
insofar as the original purpose of the act was to save
"state and federal statutes from improvident doom by
a single judge, ' 21 the constricted reading placed
upon section 1253 was not in conflict with those
original purposes. As a consequence, such procedural
pitfalls in three-judge litigation as justifiability,
subject matter jurisdiction, standing, and abstention
are no longer directly appealable to the Supreme
Court.
2 During the Senate debates, Senator Bacon said that if
three judges were to pass upon the constitutionality of the
statute,
the officers of the state would be less inclined to resist
the orders and decrees of our Federal Courts. The
people and courts of the state are more inclined to
abide by the decision of three judges than they would of
one subordinate Federal judge.
42 CONG. REC. 4853 (1908) (remarks of Senator Bacon).
See also Note, The Three-Judge Court Reassessed: Chang-
ing Roles in Federal-State Relationships, 72 YALE L. J.
1646, 1652-53 (1963); Letter of Anthony Amsterdam to
House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice, Hearings on S. 271 and H.R.
8285 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberities, and
the Administration of Justice of House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 122-24 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as House Hearings].
2228 U.S.C. § 2282 (1970).
2"Equity Rule 73, 198 F. xxxix (1912), currently FED.
R. Civ. P. 65(b).
2428 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970) prohibits federal courts from
restraining state rate fixing actions, while 28 U.S.C. § 1342
(1970) prohibits federal courts from restraining state tax
collections.
"1See Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975)
(abstention doctrine extended to civil action); Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See also note 6 supra.
"
6See note 3 supra.
2 Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419
U.S. 90, 97 (1974).
Justice White, while concurring with the result,
was unable to accept the Court's construction of "the
plain terms of § 1253." 2 TheJustice agreed with the
majority that it was judicially wasteful and inconsist-
ent with the purpose of the direct appeals act to hear
issues which had "little if any connection with the
reasons for requiring either three-judge courts or
direct review of their decisions." 2 However, he felt
that the correct approach would be one that re-
stricted those issues which the three-judge court
would be called upon to decide. Justice White
reasoned that 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284, the legisla-
tive provisions which authorize three-judge adjudica-
tion of the controversies in question, should be
construed to apply "only to orders granting or
denying . . . injunctions where the constitutionality
of the state statute is involved."20 Under such a
construction, the procedural and jurisdictional con-
tentions would be first sorted out by a single district
court judge or, if decided by a three-judge court,
would be "deemed" to be made by a single judge
court. 3' In either situation, the decision would be
appealable only to the court of appeals. This was
preferable to the majority's approach since "the
result of the Court's holding is to require a three-
judge court to pass on Younger v. Harris issues and
to direct appeals . . . [to] be heard again by three
judges. This is an exorbitant expenditure of judicial
manpower... ""
Justice Douglas, in dissent, agreed with Justice
White that the plain terms of section 1253 allowed
direct appeals to the Supreme Court upon the
dismissal of an action before a three-judge court.3
However, Justice Douglas attacked what he con-
ceived to be the true reason for the result-the
Court's increasing hostility to three-judge district
courts. The Justice agreed with the majority that
three-judge courts have outlived their original pur-
pose and are an expensive use of judicial resources.
Nonetheless, Justice Douglas pointed out that they
are becoming an increasingly important input forum
for civil rights and welfare litigants."s The Justice
also stated that "three judges may well display more
sensitivity to national policies and perspectives than
would a single judge . ... ,,5
Moreover, Justice Douglas found that the determi-






22 1d. at 807.
35Id"
" Id. at 808.
351d.
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nation of the Court's jurisdiction is Congress's
responsibility rather than the Court's.36 Some cases
had become fragmented into many disparate parts as
a result of the Court's interfering with its with own
jurisdiction, "making it difficult for courts to resolve
issues in a way which takes into account all relevant
aspects of the lawsuit." 3
MTM, Inc. v. Baxley is the latest in a series of
recent Supreme Court rulings which effectively limit
either the availability of three-judge panels or the
direct appealability of their decisions to the Supreme
Court.3 8 The result of this latest decision is to route
appeals from three-judge final determinations which
fail to reach the constitutional merits through the
court of appeals, rather than the Supreme Court.
There are two further ramifications of this deci-
sion. First, the ultimate time required to reach a final
decision will be appreciably lengthened. This is
further clouded by the uncertainty whether proce-
dural issues must be heard by three-judge panels or
may be screened by a single judge as suggested by
Justice White. In either route, the appeals process
becomes further attentuated, distorted, and unclear.
Second, the burden on the Court's docket from
section 1253 appeals will be lessened. Although the
total number of three-judge cases and section 1253
appeals to the Supreme Court are relatively min-
ute, 38 a surprisingly hefty amount of the cases set
for oral argument before the Court come from this
pool of three-judge holdings.40
Disregarding their origin, there is inefficiency,
wastefulness, and redundancy in having three judges
try these cases. Moreover, severe logistical impedi-
ments exist in convening three-judge panels in the
"
6
"In all other Cases before mentioned [not those of
original jurisdiction], the Supreme Court shall have appel-
late jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Ex-
ceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make." U.S. CONST. art. III, 2, cl. 2.
37420 U.S. at 809. See also Parks v. Harden, 504 F.2d
861, 865-67 (5th Cir. 1974).
"See Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union,
419 U.S. 90 (1974); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528
(1974).
"
9There were 249 three-judge panels in 1974. 2 DIR.
ADNI. OFF. UNITED STATES COURTS ANN. REP. 241 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as 1974 ANN. REP.]. Moreover, ICC
rulings and antitrust actions will no longer have to be
heard by three judges. See note 3 supra. At the same time,
143,284 cases were filed in federal district courts. 1974
ANN. REP. at 200. Only 3 per cent of the cases filed with
the Supreme Court in 1972 were from three-judge courts.
House Hearings, supra note 21, at 12 (testimony of Judge
J. Skelley Wright).
"Twenty-two per cent in 1972. House Hearings, supra
note 21, at 104 (testimony of Edmond D. Campbell on
behalf of the American Bar Association).
more sparsely populated regions of the nation. 41
Given the increasing number of cases filed in federal
courts, the utilization of three judges to try one case
is a flagrant abuse of judicial time and resources. 42
Finally, as a result of the burdens arising from the
convening of three-judge panels, these courts have a
disturbing tendency to attempt to carry on their
work by mail-to try the case on paper, instead of in
the courtroom. 4 ' These considerations argue for the
elimination of the three-judge panel.
There exists a chicken and egg controversy in the
theories attempting to explain the exponential in-
crease in civil rights litigation before three-judge
district courts. 4 One argument is that the increase
solely reflects the general increase in civil rights
cases."' A second argument finds the reason for the
increase from active attempts to get before the
three-judge forum." Attorneys may attempt to gain
a three-judge court for several possible reasons.
Many commentators feel that three-judge panels,
despite their clumsiness and inefficiency, provide a
better forum than a single judge court for the hearing
of constitutional issues. 47 Since the three-judge panel
represents a broader spectrum of experience and
background, it may also be less prone to reflect or
reinforce prejudices which, on occasion, exist in some
locales.48 Moreover, the use of multiple judges will
tend to provide a panel more aware of and responsive
to national considerations, exigencies, and goals. 49
4" For instance, in order to convene a three-judge district
court for a constitutional challenge in Billings, Montana,
one judge would be from Billings; the closest district judge,
if available, would be in Missoula, Montana, approxi-
mately 300 miles distant; and the circuit judge would be in
Portland, Oregon, 700 miles distant.
'4The number of cases filed in United States District
Courts in 1960 was 89,112. The number of cases filed in
United States District Courts in 1974 was 143,284. 1974
ANN. REP., supra note 39, at 200.
4 Hearings on S. 1876 Before the Subcomm. on Im-
provements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 763, 767 (1972)
(testimony of Charles Alan Wright).
4"In 1963, there were nineteen civil rights suits tried
before three-judge panels (out of a total of 129). In 1974,
there were 171 civil rights suits tried before three-judge
panels (out of a total of 249). 1974 ANN. REP, supra note
39, at 241.
" Anytime a substantial constitutional claim is made
against a statute, it automatically goes before three judges,
subject to various preliminary hurdles. See text accompany-
ing notes 51-64 infra; House Hearings, supra note 21, at
15 (testimony of J. Skelly Wright).
"House Hearings, supra note 21, at 145 (testimony of
Nathaniel Jones, General Counsel of the NAACP).





Thus, while the original rationale for convening
three-judge courts no longer exists, the underlying
considerations which made the institution originally
valuable are still retained by the needs of current civil
rights and welfare litigants.
Following the decision in MTM, two threshold
barriers must be surmounted before direct appeal is
available from a three-judge decision. The first is a
finding of substantiality (a substantial constitutional
question) and equitable jurisdiction by the single
judge district court. The second is the generally
encountered procedural and jurisdictional pitfalls of
litigation. " The bare language of sections 2281 and
2282 require the convening of a three-judge court
whenever any constitutional claim against a statute
has been made. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
construed the language to require the single judge
court to first make a battery of determinations. First,
the single judge is required to find that a substantial
constitutional question is presented. "1 Conversely, it
must then be found that the complained of statute is
not obviously unconstitutional.1 2 Since three-judge
panels are required only in constitutional claims
requesting an injunction, an historical instrument of
equity,"3 equitable jurisdiction must be properly
alleged." Finally, it must be determined that the
other requirements of sections 2281 and 2282 have
been fulfilled. "
"Substantiality" and "obviously unconstitu-
tional" have not been given clear constructions by
the Court. The substantiality doctrine was origin-
ally introduced to conserve judicial resources by dis-
posing of frivolous constitutional claims used to se-
cure delay or a federal forum. 6 A substantial con-
stitutional question is presented if there is at least
some metit to the constitutional allegations."
Likewise, the doctrine of "obvious unconstitution-
ality" is designed to conserve judicial resources
where "prior decisions make frivolous any claim
that a state statute on its face is not unconstitu-
tional." 5"
Equitable jurisdiction for three-judge district
courts requires that the single judge find that the
5 See text accompanying notes 65-67 infra.
5 Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 32 (1933).
52 Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33 (1962).
"2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRU-
DENCE § 1184 (14th ed. 1918).
" Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715
(1962).
55 Id.
5 Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933).
"
7 Note, The Three-Judge Court Act of 1910: Purpose,
Procedure and Alternatives, 62 J. CRI.. L. & C. 205, 208
(1971).
5 Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33 (1962).
complaint (1) seeks either a temporary or permanent
injunction, and (2) displays either a lack of an
adequate remedy at law or an irreparable injury, or
the existence of other special circumstances that
warrant injunctive relief. " If the pleadings inade-
quately allege the above factors, one judge may
dismiss the action without convening a three-judge
district court.
Sections 2281 and 2282, as construed by the
courts, also require that the unconstitutionality of the
contested statute be alleged; 60 that it is a federal
or state statute or administrative order being
contested; 61 and that a state officer be made a
party in challenging a state act. 62 Again, if a
complaint lacks any of these items, the single judge
will dismiss theaction. Moreover, after Hagans v.
Lavine, 63 any statutory challenge is generally ad-
judicated by a single judge prior to a hearing on the
constitutional merits before three judges.
Consequently, before a single judge will convene
three judges, it is first necessary that the single judge
find that (1) the plaintiff's constitutional claim is
substantial; (2) the defendant's constitutional claim
is not obviously frivolous; (3) there is not a concur-
rent statutory attack which should be heard first; (4)
equitable jurisdiction has been properly alleged; (5)
the attacked statute or administrative order is of
sufficient geographical scope; and (6) a state officer
has been made a party to the litigation against a state
action. After these preliminary questions have been
correctly determined, the first barrier has been
successfully hurdled. Yet, a greater barrier lies
ahead, after the case has reached the three-judge
court. 64
59 See Public Service Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S.
237 (1952); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 390-91
(1948); Ayrshire Collieries Corp. v. United States, 331
U.S. 132, 140-41 (1947).
6 See note 3 supra.
6128 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970). A corollary of this
requirement is that the challenged statute or order must not
only be an enactment of the state, but also, be of "general
application." That is, that it affects all of the state or
discrete portions of it. Ex parte Collins, 277 U.S. 565
(1925). This effectively exempts all municipal ordinances
and some state laws.
6 This is a corollary to the general application concept,
note 61 supra. Since only widely applied state statutes and
regulations are covered by the act, a "state" officer is
required to be a party. However, it is possible for a local
official to act as a "state" officer. City of Cleveland v.
United States, 323 U.S. 329 (1945).
"a415 U.S. 528. See note 38 supra.
6 If any of these first level criteria have not been
fulfilled or if the district court has erred in determinations
of them, appeal is to the court of appeals, rather than the
Supreme Court. See note 9 supra.
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Once the three-judge panel is convened, it is the
panel's duty to pass on the standing of the parties,
the justiciability of the question presented, the
existence of subject matter jurisdiction of the ques-
tion, the advisability of abstaining from hearing the
merits, 6' and other similar procedural and jurisdic-
tional questions.
Prior to Gonzalez66 it was generally held that
decisions on such procedural and jurisdictional issues
were directly appealable to the Supreme Court under
section 1253, since they effectively denied the re-
quested injunction. MTM cleared the murkiness of
the edges of the Gonzalez decision6 7 by holding that
none of these three-judge findings are directly ap-
pealable to the Supreme Court.
Therefore, MTM answered one of the complaints
against three-judge district courts: that they detract
from the Supreme Court's ability to deal with the
plethora of major issues presented before it each
term.68 However, the convoluted appellate proce-
dure, which currently accompanies three-judge ad-
judications, has been further attenuated. It is possi-
ble to become entwined in an appellate procedure
leading parties through eight courts. 69
Following the decision in Younger v. Harris, 70
which generally required federal courts to abstain
from hearing challenges to state criminal statutes,71
the three-judge district court was an institution of
little impact in the field of criminal law. Currently,
the federal criminal statutes are only rarely the tar-
get of constitutional attack. However, if Congress
succeeds in passing the codification of the federal
65Lynch.v. Household Financial Corp., 405 U.S. 538,
541 n.5 (1972).
66Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419
U.S. 90, 95 (1974).67The uncertainty as to whether both the alternative
grounds for the Gonzalez decision were necessary to the
result or whether each of the above was self-sufficient. 420
U.S. at 804. The conflicting grounds are discusbed in the
text accompanying note 11 supra.
6 Chief Justice Burger speaking to the Judicial Con-
ference in 1972, 58 A.B.AJ. 1049, 1053 (1972).
"For an in depth analysis of the potential procedural
pathways see Note. The Three-Judge Court of Act of 1910:
Purpose, Procedure and Alternatives, 62 J. CRIM. L. & C.
205, 213-17 (1971).
70401 U.S. 37; see note 6 supra.
71Id.
criminal laws, commonly referred to as S. 1,72 then
it is quite likely that the Supreme Court's decision in
M TM, Inc. v. Baxley will have serious repercus-
sions upon attempts to challenge the constitutional-
ity of the more controversial sections of the new
code.
The criminal provisions of the United States Code
have never before been codified. Congress is now
making an attempt at codification (S. 1). Not only
will the new code, if passed, bring order to the
criminal provisions currently scattered throughout
the code, it will make substantive changes in the
federal criminal law. Of these changes, some, such as
the disclosure and criminal liability provisions con-
cerning government documents and information, are
controversial and potentially plentiful sources of
future constitutional litigation." 3 Thus, if S. 1 is
passed by Congress, the three-judge panel will be
of increased interest to the criminal lawyer. As a
consequence, the holding of MTM, Inc. v. Baxley
will be of interest as it will impede the swift appeal
of such litigation to the Supreme Court.
The result of the Supreme Court's decision in
MTM, Inc. v. Baxley is to allow direct appeals to
the Supreme Court under section 1253 only when
the three-judge decision has been on the constitu-
tional merits. If the three-judge court rests its de-
termination on procedural or jurisdictional grounds,
the losing party must pursue a prolonged and po-
tentially tortuous path of litigation stretching from a
single judge district court to a three-judge district
court to a single judge district court to the court of
appeals and, ultimately, to the Supreme Court.
MTM, Inc. v. Baxley represents the latest attempt
by the Supreme. Court to actively dissuade potential
litigants from utilizing the vehicle of three-judge
courts by artificially elongating the appellate proc-
ess.
72S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess (1975).
"
3Section 1124 of the proposed code states:
Disclosing Classified Information.
(a) Offense-A person is guilty of an offense, if, being
or having been in authorized possession or control of
classified information, or having obtained such infor-
mation as a result of his being or having been a federal
public servant, he communicates such information to a
person who is not authorized to receive it.
See generally Washington Post, Sept. 29, 1975, at 1, col. 7.
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